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Edmund  Burke  has been one of the few political  thinkers  to be treated  seri- 
ously by international  theorists. According  to Martin  Wight,  one of the founders 
of the so-called  "English  School"  of international  theory,  Burke  was "[t]he  only 
political philosopher  who has turned  wholly from political theory to interna- 
tional theory."2  The resurgence  of interest  in Burke  as an international  theorist 
has not, however, generated  any consensus about how he might be classified 
within the traditions  of international  theory.  Wight variously divided thinkers 
into trichotomous  schools of Realists, Rationalists,  and Revolutionaries,  Ma- 
chiavellians,  Grotians,  and Kantians,  or theorists  of international  anarchy,  ha- 
bitual  intercourse,  or moral  solidarity;3  more  recent  international  theorists  have 
refined or supplemented  these categories  to construct  similar  trinitarian  tradi- 
tions of Realism,  Liberalism,  and  Socialism,  and  of Empirical  Realism,  Univer- 
sal Moral  Order,  and  Historical  Reason.4  Burke's  place within any of these tra- 
ditions  remains  uncertain.  Debate over whether  he was a realist  or an idealist,  a 
My thanks to Jack Censer, Istvan Hont, Susan Marks, Damn McMahon,  Julia Rudolph, 
and especially Jeremy  Waldron  for their comments on earlier  versions of this essay. 
' See David P. Fidler and Jennifer M. Welsh (eds.), Empire and Community:  Edmund 
Burke  s  Writings  and Speeches on International  Relations (Boulder, 1999). 
2  Martin Wight, "Why is There No International  Theory?"  Diplomatic Investigations: 
Essays in the Theory  of International  Politics, ed. Herbert  Butterfield  and Martin  Wight (Lon- 
don, 1966), 20; on whom see Tim Dunne, Inventing  International  Society: A History of the 
English School (Houndmills, 1998), 47-63. 
3 Martin  Wight,  International  Theory:  The Three  Traditions,  ed. Gabriele  Wight  and Brian 
Porter (London, 1991); Wight, "An Anatomy of International  Thought,"  Review of Interna- 
tional Studies, 13 (1987), 221-27; Hedley Bull, "Martin  Wight and the Theory  of International 
Relations,"  British Journal of International  Studies, 2 (1976),  101-16 (repr.  Wight, Interna- 
tional Theory,  ed. Gabriele  Wight and Porter,  ix-xxiii); Brian Porter,  "Patterns  of Thought  and 
Practice:  Martin  Wight's 'International  Theory,'  " The Reason of States: A Study in Interna- 
tional Political Theory,  ed. Michael Donelan (London, 1978), 64-74. 
4 Michael W. Doyle, Ways  of War  and Peace. Realism, Liberalism,  and Socialism (New 
York, 1997), 18-20, and  passim; David Boucher,  Political Theories  of International  Relations: 
From Thucydides  to the Present (Oxford, 1998), 28-43, and  passim. 
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Rationalist  or a Revolutionist,  has concluded  variously  that  he was a "conserva- 
tive crusader"  or an "historical  empiricist,"  a belated  dualist  or a Cold Warrior 
before  the fact, or,  most egregiously,  "a  proto-Marxist,  or more  precisely  proto- 
Gramscian"  theorist  of hegemony.5  The fact  that  Burke  so obviously  eludes  defi- 
nition may put in doubt  the analytical  utility of closely-defined "traditions"  of 
international  theory.6 
Burke's  relationship  to conceptions  of reason  of state  provides  a more pre- 
cise example  of the confusion  within  such taxonomies.  According  to one recent 
historian  of international  theory,  Burke  "laid  the foundations"  of the "conserva- 
tive approach  to International  Relations  informed  by the two moder  notions  of 
state  interest  and  necessity,  by raison d 'etat";  however,  in the words  of another, 
"Burke  ... was vehemently  opposed to the idea of Reason of State  and did not 
subscribe  to the view that  national  interests  override  moral  laws."7  The assump- 
tions on which each  of these  judgments  rests  are  clearly  incompatible:  on the one 
hand  that a "conservative  approach"  in the realm of foreign affairs  implies an 
espousal of reason  of state defined as the primacy  of "state  interest  and neces- 
sity,"  that  Burke  did indeed  acknowledge;  on the other  hand  that  reason  of state 
is defined  more  exactly  as "the  view that  national  interests  override  moral  laws" 
and  that  Burke  did not hold such a view, so could not be defined  as a reason-of- 
state theorist.  It might of course be possible that  Burke  held various  views on 
such matters  at various  points in his long literary  and  political career  or that  he 
argued  for differing  conceptions  of reason  of state  in differing  contexts.  To test 
such a hypothesis demands  a historical  account  of Burke's  relationship  to the 
theories  of reason  of state  held by his contemporaries  and  predecessors. 
5 R. J. Vincent, "Edmund  Burke and the Theory of International  Relations,"  Review of 
International Studies, 10 (1984), 205-18; David Boucher, "The Character  of the History of 
Philosophy  of International  Relations  and the Case of Edmund  Burke,"  Review ofInternational 
Studies, 17 (1991),  127-48; Boucher, Political Theories of International  Relations, 308-29; 
Vilho Harle,  "Burke  the International  Theorist-or  the War  of the Sons of Light  and the Sons of 
Darkness,"  European Values  in International  Relations, ed. Vilho Harle (London, 1990), 59, 
72; Kenneth  W. Thompson,  Fathers of International  Thought:  The Legacy of Political Theory 
(Baton Rouge, 1994), 100; Fred Halliday,  Rethinking  International  Relations (London, 1994), 
108-13. (Thanks  to Anders Stephanson  for this last reference.) 
6 Jennifer M. Welsh, Edmund  Burke and International Relations (London, 1995), 6-9, 
172-80; Welsh, "Edmund  Burke and the Commonwealth  of Europe: The Cultural  Bases of 
International  Order,"  Classical Theories of International  Relations, eds. Ian Clark  and Iver B. 
Neumann  (Houndmills, 1996), 173-77, 183-86; Empire  and Community,  ed. Fidler and Welsh, 
38-39, 51-56; and see Traditions  of International  Ethics, eds. Terry  Nardin  and David R. Mapel 
(Cambridge,  1992); Timothy  Dunne, "Mythology  or Methodology?  Traditions  in International 
Theory,"  Review of International  Studies, 19 (1993), 305-18; Ian Clark,  "Traditions  of Thought 
and Classical Theories of International  Relations," Classical Theories of International  Rela- 
tions, eds. Clark  and Neumann, 1-19. 
7 Torbj6m L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction 
(Manchester,  1992), 141, 143; Boucher,  Political Theories of International  Relations, 14. 
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To  place Burke  within  traditions  of reason  of state  might  seem to be a simple 
category error.  After all, he famously scorned "dashing  Machiavellian  politi- 
cians," deplored  "the odious maxims of a Machiavellian  policy," condemned 
"the  dreadful  maxim  of Machiavel  that  in great  affairs  men are  not to be wicked 
by halves,"  and  identified  the Discorsi as the inflammatory  textbook  of French 
republicanism.8  His strictures  on Machiavelli and Machiavellianism  affirmed 
avant  la lettre  the classic moder  account  of reason  of state  offered  by Friedrich 
Meinecke, which counterposed  "raison  d'etat on the one hand,  and ethics and 
law on the other"  and traced  the emergence of this separation  to the heathen 
Florentine  who had  given the tradition  its familiar  nickname.9  Such  accounts  of 
reason  of state  and  of Machiavelli  reinforced  the long-standing  interpretation  of 
Burke  as the last of the medieval theorists  of natural  law, for whom no merely 
human  calculations  of advantage  or interest  could override  the dictates  of divine 
reason.  If reason  of state  represented  the  doctrine  that  political  expediency  should 
supersede  moral  law, then Burke  could only have been its (and Machiavelli's) 
enemy: his "politics ... were grounded  on recognition  of the universal  law of 
reason  and  justice ordained  by God as the foundation  of a good community.  In 
this  recognition  the  Machiavellian  schism  between  politics  and  morality  is closed, 
and  it is exactly in this respect  that  Burke  stands  apart  from  the moder  positiv- 
ists and pragmatists  who in claiming him have diminished  him."'0  To accept 
otherwise  would  have allowed  him to fall back  into  the hands  of those  exponents 
of expediency,  the utilitarians  and  the secularists. 
These accounts of reason of state and of natural  law arguably  depended 
upon a misapprehension  of the moder  natural  law theory  to which Burke  was 
heir.  That  theory,  revived initially by Hugo Grotius  and elaborated  by his suc- 
cessors, took its foundational  principle  of self-preservation  from  the Stoics. To 
determine  the  limits  of self-preservation  as a practical  principle  always  demanded 
8 Edmund  Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), in The Writings  and 
Speeches of Edmund  Burke, ed. L. G. Mitchell, VIII, The French Revolution  1790-1794 (Ox- 
ford, 1989), 60, 132; Burke,  Fourth  Letter  on a Regicide Peace (1795-96), in R. B. McDowell 
(ed.), The Writings  and Speeches of Edmund  Burke,  ed. R. B. McDowell, IX, I: The  Revolution- 
ary War  1794-1797; II: Ireland (Oxford, 1991), 69 (alluding to Machiavelli,  Discorsi, I. 27); 
Burke,  Second Letter on a Regicide Peace (1796), Writings  and Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 
282. 
9 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in 
Modern History, tr. Douglas Scott, intro. Werner  Stark (New Brunswick, 1998), 28, 29. In 
Cosmopolitanism  and the Nation State, tr. Robert  B. Kimber  (Princeton,  1970), 101, Meinecke 
had argued  that Burke "struck  the first decisive blow against conceptions of the state that the 
eighteenth  century  had formed  on the basis of natural  law" and assimilated  him to Machiavelli 
and later advocates of Realpolitik  who had also recognized the importance  of "the irrational 
components  of the life of the state, for the power of traditions,  customs, instinct,  and impulsive 
feelings." 
10  Burke  s Politics. Selected Writings  and Speeches of Edmund  Burke  on Reform,  Revolu- 
tion, and War,  Ross J. Hoffman  and Paul Levack (New York, 1949), xv. 
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calculations  of competing goods according  to consequentialist  criteria."  This 
was true no less for bodies politic and their rulers  than it was for private  per- 
sons. In the political realm  the fundamental  determining  factor  in any calcula- 
tion of outcomes  would be necessity. In the case of the respublica necessity, as 
a principle  of political action, could only be justified by an appeal  to that  salus 
populi which was the suprema  lex, in Cicero's famous  words (De Legibus, III, 
3). Cicero placed severe constraints  upon such calculations  in the municipal 
sphere,  and  restricted  them  to the ends of self-defense,  security,  or  the  protection 
of liberty;  any actions  taken  in pursuit  of such ends  had  also to avoid infamy  and 
to be in accordance  with the republican  constitution.'2  In their later  recensions 
-shorn  of the specifically Roman and republican  legal context within which 
Cicero  wrote-such  theories  could reconcile the principles  of natural  law with 
strictly  limited appeals  to necessity in the interests  of the common good; they 
could also be extended  beyond  the municipal  to the international  realm.13 
This "moder" tradition  of natural  jurisprudence,  which rested upon the 
arguments  of Stoic ethics,  was utilitarian  to the extent  that  it depended  upon  the 
calibration  of competing  goods in relation  to specific  ends.  To  place  Burke  within 
the theory  of reason  of state  derived  from  this tradition  implies  no inconsistency 
in his thought.  The opponent  of "Machiavellian"  expediency  could equally  well 
be the proponent  of Ciceronian  "necessity":  the difference  between  the two de- 
pended  upon  the criteria  deployed,  the circumstances  that  could be appealed  to, 
and  the consequences  that  were desired  or imagined.  To  situate  Burke  within  this 
strain  of early  modem reason  of state  theory  also makes  it possible to appreciate 
just "how much weight [he] attaches  to considerations  based on expediency, 
treated  simply  as a practical  regard  for  consequences."'4 Moreover,  since reason 
of state within this tradition  was consequentialist  precisely because it was 
grounded  in a neo-Stoic conception  of natural  law, to see Burke  as a reason-of- 
state  theorist  in this context  neatly  avoids the sterile  dispute  about  the true  char- 
acter  of his political thought  as either  utilitarian  or natural  jurisprudential.'5  It 
could be described  as both, so long as the tradition  of natural  jurisprudence  in 
question  was the "moder" one initiated  by Grotius  and so long as the utilitari- 
1 Richard Tuck, "The 'Modem' Theory of Natural Law," The Languages of Political 
Theory  in Early-Modern  Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge,  1987), 99-119; Tuck, Phi- 
losophy and Government,  1572-1651 (Cambridge,  1993), 172-76. 
12 Norberto de Sousa, "Cicero on the Themes of Necessity and Public Utility," unpub- 
lished paper  presented  to the Seminar,  "The Politics of Necessity and the Language  of Reason 
of State,"  King's College, Cambridge,  22 January  1993. 
13 Richard  Tuck, The Rights of War  and Peace: Political Thought  and the International 
Orderfrom Grotius  to Kant (Oxford, 1999), 18-23, 29-31. 
14 Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in 
Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge, 1996), 196. 
15  John Dinwiddy, "Utility and Natural Law in Burke's Thought: A Reconsideration," 
Studies in Burke and His Time, 16 (1974), 107, 123-25. 
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anism  in question  was of this consequentialist  kind.  The assertion  that  "the  natu- 
ral-law  tradition  and  consequentialism  are  opposed  at a very deep level"  is there- 
fore  not true  of all forms  of natural  jurisprudence  or even of consequentialism;16 
nor is it necessary  to choose between them to characterize  Burke's  political or 
international  thought. 
Burke's  reason-of-state  theory  could be applied  equally  to the internal  con- 
stitution and the external  relations of a state. In this way its scope extended 
beyond  the internal  political determinations  laid down by Cicero  to the interna- 
tional  realm  treated  by the "moder" theorists  of natural  law like Grotius.  Rea- 
son of state was thus Janus-faced  like its conceptual  near-neighbors  in early 
moder  political thought,  sovereignty,  and the balance of power.  7 Like them, 
reason of state crossed the boundary  between political theory,  defined as the 
theory  of legitimacy  and  distribution  of power  within  the state,  and  international 
theory.  In  both spheres  reason  of state  acknowledged  the compulsions  of neces- 
sity; its particular  theoretical  concern was therefore  with the contingent,  the 
extraordinary,  and the unforeseeable.  "A high degree of causal necessity,"  ar- 
gued Meinecke,  "which  the agent  himself is accustomed  to conceive as absolute 
and inescapable,  and to feel most profoundly,  is part  of the very essence of all 
action  prompted  by raison d 'etat."'8  Since necessity has no law (necessitas non 
habet  legem),  reason  of state  could not be codified or legislated.  Reason  of state 
alone could not determine  which circumstances  were truly  cases of extreme  ne- 
cessity and  hence  which  precise  occasions  could  permit  the overriding  of custom 
and law. It could only lay down norms from which such exceptions could be 
derived,  and  more  generally  it provided  a consequentialist  means  of applying  the 
norms of natural  law. In these regards  reason of state was close to resistance 
theory  which also dealt  with extremity  and  overwhelming  necessity.  Resistance 
theory  did,  however,  lay down stringent  conditions  under  which rebellion  might 
be justified, even if only in retrospect,  and offered a wider range  of agents the 
possibility of making  judgments  of necessity, even to the point of democratic 
agency. The compulsion of necessity demanded  in reason of state theory was 
assumed  to be universally  recognizable  but  only under  particular  circumstances 
by specific, usually  sovereign,  agents.  The conditions  which would  make  neces- 
sity both evident and compelling could never be defined with any precision;  it 
therefore  demanded  princely or consiliar discretion  for its application.  These 
requirements  placed it firmly among the arcana imperii  and left it open to the 
16 Pace Joseph Boyle, "Natural  Law and International  Ethics," in Traditions  of Interna- 
tional Ethics, eds. Nardin and Mapel, 119; compare Carl Friedrich,  Constitutional  Reason of 
State: The Survival  of the Constitutional  Order  (Providence,  R.I., 1957), 31-32. 
17 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty  (Cambridge, 19862),  chs. 4-5; M. S. Anderson, The Rise of 
Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London, 1993), 150-54. 
18 Meinecke,  Machiavellism,  6 
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charge  (especially  from  those  who were  excluded  from  judging)  that  it was merely 
subjective,  arbitrary,  and  unconstrainable. 
Because reason of state, whether  municipal  or international,  was morally 
ambivalent,  two types might  legitimately  be inferred,  one natural  and  hence  jus- 
tifiable,  the other  merely  putative  and  hence reprehensible.19  The English  Whig 
tradition  which  preceded  Burke  and  upon  which he drew  contained  examples  of 
these two strains  of reason  of state.  For  example,  the Marquis  of Halifax  argued 
in 1684 that  "there  is a natural  reason  of State, an undefinable  thing grounded 
upon  the Common  good of mankind,  which is immortall,  and  in all changes  and 
Revolutions  still preserveth  its Originall  right  of saving a Nation,  when the Let- 
ter  of the Law perhaps  would destroy  it."20  "Reall  Necessity,"  he later  affirmed, 
"is not to bee resisted,  and  pretended  necessity is not to bee alleadged."21  Since 
politicians still alleged necessity nonetheless, it would be distrusted  as simply 
one of the "Arcana  Imperii,"  complained  John  Toland  in 1701, "when  in reality 
Reason  of State  is nothing  else but  the right  reason  of managing  the affairs  of the 
State  at home and  abroad,  according  to the Constitution  of the Government,  and 
with regard  to the Interest  or Power of other  Nations."22  The difficulty  of judg- 
ing whether  reason of state was natural  and directed  legitimately  towards  the 
interest  of the community,  or contrived  for the benefit of the rulers  alone, made 
it both contestable  and  open to apparently  opposing constructions,  even within 
the thought  of a single theorist.  As Burke  himself noted in his Third  Letter  on a 
Regicide Peace (1796-97), "Necessity,  as it has no law, so it has no shame;  but 
moral  necessity is not like metaphysical,  or even physical. In that  category,  it is 
a word of loose signification,  and  conveys different  ideas to different  minds."23 
Burke's  engagement  with the language  of reason  of state  ran  from his first 
published  political work, the Vindication  of Natural  Society (1756), to the last, 
the Third  Letter  on a Regicide Peace. In this he remarked  in passing that  "rea- 
son of state and common-sense are two things";24  thirty years earlier,  in the 
Vindication,  he had satirized  contemporary  consequentialism  along the same 
lines: 
19  Maurizio  Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The  Acquisition  and Transformation 
of the Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge,  1992), 273-74. 
20 George Savile, Marquis  of Halifax, The Character  of a Trimmer  (1684), in The Works  of 
George Savile Marquis  of Halifax, ed. Mark  N. Brown (3 vols.; Oxford, 1989), I, 191. 
21  Halifax, "Prerogative"  (1685-88?), in Works  of George Savile Marquis of Halifax, ed. 
Brown, II, 41. 
22  [John  Toland,] The  Art of Governing  by Partys (London, 1701), 93-94. 
23  Burke, Third  Letter on a Regicide Peace  (1796-97),  in Writings  and Speeches, ed. 
McDowell, IX, 344. 
24 Burke, Third  Letter on a Regicide Peace, in Writings  and Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 
300. 
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All Writers  on the Science of Policy are agreed, and they agree with 
Experience,  that  all Governments  must  frequently  infringe  the Rules of 
Justice  to support  themselves;  that  Truth  must give way to Dissimula- 
tion;  Honesty  to Convenience;  and  Humanity  itself to the  reigning  Inter- 
est. The Whole of this Mystery  of Iniquity  is called the Reason  of State. 
It is a Reason, which I own I cannot  penetrate.  What Sort of a Protec- 
tion is this of the general Right, that is maintained  by infringing  the 
Rights of Particulars?  What  sort  of Justice  is this, which is inforced  by 
Breaches  of  its own  Laws?  ...  For my part, I say what a plain Man 
would say on such an Occasion.  I can never  believe, that  any Institution 
agreeable  to Nature,  and  proper  for  Mankind,  could find it necessary,  or 
even expedient  in any Case whatsoever  to do, what  the best and  worthi- 
est Instincts  of Mankind  warn  us to avoid.25 
The publication  of Bolingbroke's deistic writings in 1754 and of Rousseau's 
second  Discourse in 1755 provided  the immediate  targets  for the Vindication's 
ironic  attempt  to undermine  arguments  in favor  of natural  religion  by reducing 
equivalent  arguments  for natural  society ad absurdum.26  However,  Burke's  tar- 
get in this  passage  of the Vindication  was neither  Bolingbroke  nor  Rousseau  but 
Hume. In the Treatise  of Human  Nature (1739-40) Hume had argued  that the 
laws of nations did not supersede  the laws of nature.  Both persons  and bodies 
politic were bound  by the same duties to uphold  property  and promises;  how- 
ever,  the obligation  is weaker  for  princes  than  for  private  persons:  "the  morality 
of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same  force as that of private 
persons,"  in proportion  to the advantages  to be gained by nations rather  than 
individuals  from  security  of property,  the administration  ofjustice, and  the adju- 
dication of equity, he argued.27  When Hume returned  to this question in the 
Enquiry  Concerning  the  Principles  ofMorals (1751), he restated  the distinction 
in the  language  of reason  of state  and  provided  the  immediate  occasion  for  Burke's 
satire  in the Vindication: 
25  [Burke,] A Vindication  of Natural Society (1756),  in The Writings  and Speeches of 
Edmund  Burke, ed. T. O. McLoughlin and James T. Boulton, I, The Early Writings  (Oxford, 
1997), 154. Cf. Rousseau's almost exactly contemporaneous  remarks  in "The State of War"  (c. 
1755-56), in Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political  Writings,  ed. Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge, 1997), 163: "according  to the ideas of princes about their absolute 
independence,  force alone, speaking  to citizens in the guise of law and foreigners  in the guise of 
reason of state, deprives the latter of the power and the former of the will to resist, so that 
everywhere  the vain name of justice only serves as a shield for violence." 
26 J. C. Weston, Jr., "The Ironic Purpose of Burke's Vindication  Vindicated,"  JHI, 19 
(1958), 435-41; Burke:  Pre-Revolutionary  Writings,  ed. Ian Harris  (Cambridge,  1993), 4-6. 
27 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40),  L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. 
Nidditch (Oxford, 19782),  567-68 (III. ii. 11, "Of the laws of nations"). 
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The  observance  ofjustice, though  useful  among  [nations],  is not guarded 
by so strong  a necessity as it is among individuals;  and  the moral obli- 
gation holds proportion  with the usefulness.  All politicians  will allow, 
and most philosophers,  that REASON OF STATE  may, in particular 
emergencies,  dispense  with the rules  ofjustice, and  invalidate  any  treaty 
or alliance,  where the strict  observance  of it would be prejudicial,  in a 
considerable  degree, to either of the contracting  parties. But nothing 
less than the most extreme  necessity, it is confessed, can justify indi- 
viduals in a breach  of promise,  or an invasion of the properties  of oth- 
ers.28 
Burke's  ironic  recension  of Hume left the theoretical  foundations  of this argu- 
ment  for acting  in accordance  with reason  of state  unscathed.  Only if civil soci- 
ety itself were illegitimate  would such reason  of state  be unconscionable.  If, as 
Burke  later  argued  in the  Reflections,  government  was a necessary  "contrivance 
of human  wisdom to provide for human  wants"  and if "men have a right that 
these  wants  should  be provided  for  by this  wisdom,"  it followed  that  government 
was empowered  to provide for those wants by any necessary  means:  the indi- 
vidual members  of civil society had already  resigned to the government  their 
"right  of self-defense,  the first  law of nature,"  and  had  therefore  ceded adjudica- 
tions of necessity to their  governors.29 
Even within the municipal sphere, Burke argued,  any law might be sus- 
pended,  though  only under  the compulsion  of extreme  necessity  and  in the inter- 
est of the preservation  of the political community.  Conor Cruise O'Brien has 
taken such an admission  to be "one of those distressing  matters,  abounding  in 
the Burkean  universe,  for  which some arrangement  of veils was normally  appro- 
priate."30  However,  the principle  seems to have caused  Burke  little distress  and 
would hardly  have been a revelation  to him. As he told the House of Commons 
in 1780, the great  patent  offices in the Exchequer  could  not be swept  away in the 
name  of Economical  Reform  because,  as offices held for  life, they  were a species 
of property  and  only necessity could override  the principle  of legitimate  posses- 
sion. "There  are  occasions ofpublick necessity,  so vast, so clear,  so evident,"  he 
nevertheless  admitted,  "that  they supersede  all laws. Law being made only for 
the benefit of the community,  no law can set itself up against the cause and 
28  David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751),  ed. Tom L. 
Beauchamp  (Oxford, 1998), 100 (Section IV, "Of Political Society"). 
29 Burke,  Reflections  on the Revolution  in France, in Writings  and Speeches, ed. Mitchell, 
VIII, 110; and see lain Hampsher-Monk,  "Burke  and the Religious Sources of Skeptical  Con- 
servatism,"  in The Skeptical Tradition  Around 1800. Skepticism  in Philosophy, Science, and 
Society, ed. Johan  Van der Zande and Richard  H. Popkin (Dordrecht,  1998), 235-59. 
30  Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Suspecting Glance (London, 1972), 34-35. 
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reason of all law."31  Only such overmastering  compulsion,  defined  in accor- 
dance  with  public  necessity  (the  Ciceronian  utilitas  publica  or utilitas  rei 
publicce), could justify  an appeal to reason of state. On the same grounds, he 
charged that the Protestant Association's  opposition  to Catholic relief,  which 
they "dignified by the name of reason of state, and security for constitutions and 
commonwealths"  was a mere "receipt of policy, made up of a detestable com- 
pound of malice, cowardice, and sloth," and hence not a legitimate invocation of 
the principle.32  Because the appeal to necessity  was only justifiable  for the ben- 
efit of the whole community and ultimately the preservation of society itself, the 
occasions  on which it could legitimately be invoked had to be extraordinary and 
overmastering: as Burke argued consistently during the impeachment of Warren 
Hastings,  it could  therefore not be raised into a regular principle  of  govern- 
ment.33 
Burke argued that only the Glorious Revolution fulfilled these exacting con- 
ditions in recent English history and hence provided a reliable standard against 
which  to judge  later claims  of public necessity.  Richard Price's assertion that 
1688 had made cashiering kings a regular principle of the British constitution 
forced Burke to refine this theory of state necessity. Against Price, Burke argued 
that the Revolution had been "an act of necessity,  in the strictest moral sense in 
which necessity  can be taken," and that it could not therefore be erected into a 
constitutional precedent. The extremity of the situation showed that it was pos- 
sible "to reconcile the use of both a fixed rule and an occasional  deviation" and 
that this was the only way to remedy such an emergency  without a complete 
dissolution of government.34  This argument resuscitated a Tory means to defend 
the Whig doctrine of the ancient constitution in the aftermath of 1688; by adopt- 
ing it Burke was  also following  the lead of the nervous Whig prosecutors of 
Henry Sacheverell  in 1712.35  This particular argument from necessity  had first 
been employed  as a justification  of the Revolution  by Tories such as Edmund 
31 Edmund  Burke,  "Speech  on Presenting  to the House of Commons,  a Plan for the Better 
Security  of the Independence  of Parliament,  and the (Economical  Reformation  of the Civil and 
Other  Establishments"  (1780), in The Works  of the Right  Honourable  Edmund  Burke  (16 vols.; 
London, 1803-27), III, 308-9. 
32 Edmund  Burke,  "Speech  at the Guildhall  in Bristol, Previous  to the Late Election in that 
City, Upon Certain  Points Relative to his Parliamentary  Conduct"  (1780), in Works  of Edmund 
Burke,  III, 418. 
33 Carl  B. Cone, Edmund  Burke  and the Nature  of Politics (2 vols.; Lexington, Ky., 1957- 
64), II, 205-7; W. H. Greenleaf,  "Burke  and State Necessity: The Case of Warren  Hastings," 
Staatsrdson.  Studien  zur Geschichte  einespolitischen Begriff,  ed. Roman  Schnur  (Berlin, 1975), 
549-67; Frederick  G. Whelan,  Edmund  Burke  and India: Political Morality  and Empire  (Pitts- 
burgh, 1996), 188-93, 199-202. 
34 Richard  Price, A Discourse on the Love of our Country  (London, 17893),  34; Burke, 
Reflections  on the Revolution  in France, in Mitchell (ed.), Writings  and Speeches, VIII, 68, 72. 
35 Mark  Goldie, "Tory  Political Thought, 1689-1714"  (PhD diss., Cambridge,  1978), 328; 
J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution  and the Feudal Law: A Reissue with Retrospect 
(Cambridge, 1987), 381. 
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Bohun and Thomas  Long, as well as by the Whig Charles  Blount,  who had all 
relied  upon Grotius  to justify a limited  right  of resistance,  as had  defacto theo- 
rists like Anthony  Ascham earlier  in the seventeenth  century.36  In Book I of De 
lure Belli ac Pacis (1625) Grotius  admitted  that  even some of the laws of God 
carried  a tacit exception in cases of extreme  and imminent  peril, though in no 
case would this be defensible if consideration  of the common good were to be 
abandoned.  On such minimalist  grounds  resistance  would be justified against  a 
ruler  who had  renounced  his governmental  authority,  alienated  his kingdom,  or 
otherwise  made  himself  an  enemy  to the  people.37  Stripped  of its explicitly  Grotian 
roots, though maintaining  the appeal to self-preservation,  this argument  pro- 
vided the Whig managers  of Sacheverell's  impeachment  with just the weapon 
they needed  to combat  the doctrine  of non-resistance  without  raising  the specter 
of a general  and  unrestricted  right  of rebellion.38  Burke  quoted  the transcript  of 
the Sacheverell trial at length in the Appealfrom the New to the Old Whigs 
(1791) to show (in Robert Walpole's words) that only "the utmost  necessity 
ought ...  to engage a nation, in its own defense,  for the preservation of the 
whole."39 
During  the debate  on the French  Revolution,  reason  of state in the Grotian 
tradition  provided  Burke  with an argument  to show that  the events of 1688 (in 
England) and 1789 (in France)  were similar in that each presented  a case of 
imminent  danger  that  justified  armed  intervention  and  hence fulfilled  the condi- 
tions of"necessity."  This argument  from  necessity thereby  supplied  Burke  with 
a weapon  against  those English  Jacobins  who assimilated  the French  Revolution 
to the Glorious  Revolution,  and it helped him to show that 1789 was indefen- 
sible for  just the same reasons  that 1688 had been  justifiable.  Burke  could then 
argue  that  the French  Revolution  was uniquely  threatening,  because it jeopar- 
dized the true interests  of the states of Europe  which were the basis of their 
natural  reasons  of state.  On these grounds,  a crusade  against  the French  Revolu- 
36 Mark  Goldie, "Edmund  Bohun and  Jus Gentium  in the Revolution  Debate, 1689-1693," 
The  Historical  Journal, 20 (1977), 569-86; John  M. Wallace,  Destiny  His Choice. The  Loyalism 
of Andrew  Marvell (Cambridge,  1968), 32-35. Anthony  Ascham, A Discourse: Wherein  is Ex- 
amined What  is Particularly Lawful during the Confusions and Revolutions of Government 
(London, 1648) was republished  as A Seasonable Discourse..., in 1689. 
37 Hugo Grotius,  De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625), I. 4. 7-14, cited for example by [Charles 
Blount,] The  Proceedings of the Present Parliament  Justified by the Opinion  of the Most Judi- 
cious and Learned Hugo Grotius (London, 1689); [Thomas Long,] The Historian Unmask'd 
(London, 1689), 22, 35. 
38  Geoffrey Holmes, The Trial of Dr Sacheverell (London, 1973), 139; Peter N. Miller, 
Defining the Common  Good: Empire,  Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century  Britain 
(Cambridge, 1994), 79-87. 
39  Burke,  An Appeal  from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in Daniel E. Ritchie (ed.), 
Edmund  Burke,  Further  Reflections  on the Revolution  in France (Indianapolis,  1992), 131; for 
Burke's use of the trial see ibid., 124-44. 
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tion would be "the most clearly  just and necessary war, that this or any other 
nation  ever carried  on,"40  in accordance  with the principles  of the law of nations 
laid down by the Swiss jurist  Emerich  de Vattel. For  Burke  the crucial  distinc- 
tion was that  England  before 1688 was like France  after and not before 1789. 
Though  the  English  Jacobins  wanted  to see the French  republicans  as the equiva- 
lent of the Whigs, for Burke  they were not only the equivalent  of the Jacobites 
but were in fact more like Louis XIV in their  desire for universal  monarchy. 
Burke's  appeal  to necessity revealed  the conceptual  difference  between  the 
Glorious  Revolution  and  the French  Revolution.  The former  had been limited, 
strategic,  and  constrained  precisely  by the  principle  ofsaluspopuli; the latter  set 
fair  to unleash  illimitable  consequences  as a result  of its unprincipled  and  unre- 
stricted  reasons  of state that  would endanger  the integrity  of all states. This, at 
least, was the direction  of Burke's  argument  in the years  following the publica- 
tion of the Reflections  and marked  a shift in his conception of reason of state 
between 1790 and 1793. However,  the fundamental  argument,  derived  from  ne- 
cessity and  based  upon  vestiges of the Roman  and  neo-Roman  theory  of reason 
of state,  was contained  in the  Reflections  itself. The Glorious  Revolution  and  the 
French  Revolution  could  be distinguished  according  to the true  and  false appeals 
to necessity each had inspired.  Within  the terms  of the ius gentium  England  in 
1688 and  France  after 1793 became  conceptually  equivalent  because  each state 
was internally  divided,  each was threatened  by or itself threatened  an imminent 
danger,  and hence each could justifiably necessitate armed  intervention.  The 
distinction  lay in the fact that  France  after 1793 (under  the militant,  oppressive 
and  outwardly  aggressive  Directory)  was equated  with England  in 1688 (under 
the rule of the tyrannical  James  II). As Burke  put it in a startling  passage of the 
Reflections,  thick with classical allusions and founded upon an argument  for 
conquest  that  was originally  Tory,  not Whig: 
Laws are  commanded  to hold their  tongues  against  arms;  and  tribunals 
fall to the ground  with the peace they are  no longer  able to uphold.  The 
Revolution of 1688 was obtained by a just war, in the only case in 
which any war, and much more a civil war, can be just. "Justa  bella 
quibus necessaria."41 
Burke  here  alluded  to two of the most frequently-cited  classical mottos  jus- 
tifying force over law -Cicero's  maxim  silent leges inter armas (Pro Milone, 
IV. 11)  and  the speech  of Pontius  the Samnite  in which he argued  that  the Roman 
40 Burke,  A Letter to a Noble Lord (1796), in Writings  and Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 
168. 
41  Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, Writings  and Speeches, ed. Mitchell, 
VIII,  80. 
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rejection  of the Samnites'  conciliatory  overtures  after  the battle  of the Caudine 
Forks  justified them  in going to war  on grounds  of necessity:  iustum  est bellum, 
Samnites,  quibus  necessarium  (Livy, Histories, IX. 1. 10). In De lure Belli ac 
Pacis Grotius  had similarly  argued  that  only the municipal  laws of a particular 
community  are  "silent  ... in the midst  of arms"  while the natural  law remains  in 
force. Grotius  further  argued  that  anyone who has given another  just cause for 
war cannot claim to be acting defensively when they are attacked;  just so the 
Samnites  were  justified in attacking  the Romans  after  the battle  of the Caudine 
Forks.42  When Roman  implacability  demanded  extreme  measures  in response, 
war  became  a necessity,  and  arms  became  lawful  for  those  who were deprived  of 
all other hope. In just such terms, Burke concluded that the intransigence  of 
James  II had been a similar  "case of war,  and not of constitution,"  "an  extraor- 
dinary  question  of state, and  wholly out of law."43 
External  intervention,  in this case by the Protestant  Prince  of Orange  and  his 
army,  had  been  justified in England's  internal  affairs,  as a civil war outside the 
bounds of municipal  law became a public war between two princes  under  the 
principles  of the ius gentium. In such a contest victory generated  a legitimate 
appeal  to conquest.  On these grounds  it was possible to see William's  interven- 
tion in 1688 as an example of a just war and his victory over James  as a legiti- 
mate act of conquest.44  It is possible that  Burke  here was thinking  primarily  as 
an Irishman:  the Williamite  War  of 1689-91 that  marked  the Irish  phase of the 
Glorious Revolution was indeed a war of conquest, as the bloodless standoff 
between  James  II and  the future  William  III  had  hardly  been in England.45  How- 
ever, more easily documented  is Burke's debt here to Vattel. In Le Droit des 
Gens (1758) Vattel  argued  that every foreign power had a right to aid an op- 
pressed people if insupportable  tyranny  had driven them to rebellion,  just as 
"[t]he  English  justly complained  of James  II"  in 1688. "Whenever  matters  are 
carried  so far as to produce a civil war, foreign powers may assist that party 
which appears  to them to have justice on its side," moreover,  "every foreign 
power  has a right  to succour  an oppressed  people who implore  their  assistance." 
On these grounds  William of Orange  had  justly intervened  on the side of the 
injured  parties,  the people of England.46 
42 Grotius,  De lure Belli ac Pacis, "Prolegomena"  26; II. 1. 18; and see David J. Bederman, 
"Reception  of the Classical Tradition  in International  Law: Grotius's  De Jure Belli ac Pacis," 
Grotiana, 16/17 (1995/96), 32. 
43 Burke,  Reflections  on the Revolution  in France, in Writings  and Speeches, ed. Mitchell, 
VIII, 80. 
44 Martyn  P.  Thompson,  "The  Idea  of Conquest  in the Controversies  over the 1688 Revolu- 
tion," JHI, 38 (1977), 33-46; Mark  Goldie, "Charles  Blount's Intention  in Writing  King Will- 
iam and Queen  Mary Conquerors  (1693)," Notes and Queries, 223 (1978), 527-32. 
45 The argument  that Burke's  divided Irishness  inflected the whole course of this political 
thinking  is the burden  of Conor  Cruise  O'Brien, The Great  Melody:  A Thematic  Biography  and 
Commented  Anthology  of Edmund  Burke (London, 1992). 
46 Emerich  de Vattel,  Le Droit des Gens (Neuchatel, 1758), II. 4. 56;  III. 18. 296. 
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Vattel's use of the Glorious  Revolution  to justify  intervention by foreign 
powers and Burke's argument that the Revolution  presented a case of just war 
were in fact the same argument, each with the conclusion  that 1688 had been a 
just war precisely because intervention from outside had been justified accord- 
ing to Vattel's criteria. Burke used just this argument, with direct support from 
Vattel, in Thoughts on French Affairs (1791)  to show  that "[i]n this state of 
things (that is in the case of a divided kingdom)  by the law of nations, Great 
Britain, like every other Power, is free to take any part she pleases." "For this," 
he had earlier counselled  his son, "consult a very republican writer Vattell."47 
This appeal to Vattel harked back to an earlier debate on the morality of war, 
when -in  the case of British capture of the Dutch island of St Eustatius in 1781 
during the American War-  Burke had invoked "Vattel as being the latest and 
best [exponent of natural law], and whose testimony he preferred; because, be- 
ing a modem writer, he expresses the sense of the day in which we live."48  In the 
case of the French Revolution, however, the question ofjustice  was more vexed 
and controvertible. According to Vattel, it was "a very celebrated question, and 
of the highest importance" whether the aggrandisement of a neighboring power 
could be a sufficient and just reason for war.49  Although Grotius and later Wolff 
had specifically  argued that it could never be a just grounds for war "to take up 
arms in order to weaken a growing power" simply because  it might become  a 
source of danger,50  Vattel disagreed, and provided Burke with just the reason-of- 
state argument he needed to justify  a holy war against the Directory. Vattel ar- 
gued that the safety of a state could be so threatened by a looming neighbor that 
it would be just to anticipate aggression  in the interests of the liberty and order 
of the whole  of Europe, as had been the case  during the War of the Spanish 
Succession.5' 
He argued further that modem Europe was now a kind of republic in which 
all of the formerly separate nations were bound together by the ties of common 
interest. The balance of power was the safeguard of those common interests and 
provided the means of guaranteeing liberty for Europe. A purely utilitarian cal- 
47 Edmund  Burke, Thoughts  on French Affairs (1791), in Ritchie (ed.), Further Reflec- 
tions on the Revolution in France, 207; Burke to Richard  Burke, Jr., 5 August 1791, in The 
Correspondence  of Edmund  Burke: VI  July 1789-December  1791, ed. Alfred Cobban  and Rob- 
ert A. Smith (Cambridge,  1967), 317. 
48 Edmund Burke, "Speech on the Seizure and Confiscation of Private Property in St 
Eustatius,"  14 May 1781, in The  Parliamentary  History of Englandfrom the Earliest Times  to 
1803 (36 vols.; London, 1806-20), XXII, col. 231; and see Ronald  Hurst,  The Golden  Rock. An 
Episode of the American War  of Independence:  1775-1783 (London, 1996). 
49 Vattel,  Droit des Gens, III. 3. 42. 
50 Grotius,  De lure Belli ac Pacis, II. 1. 17; II. 22. 5; Christian  Wolff,  Jus Gentium  Methodo 
Scientifica  Pertractatum  (1749), ?? 640, 651-52; Alfred Vagts and Detlev F. Vagts, "The Bal- 
ance of Power in International  Law: A History  of an Idea,"  American  Journal of International 
Law, 73 (1979), 562; Tuck,  Rights of War  and Peace, 189-90. 
51 Vattel,  Droit des Gens, III. 3. 42-44. 
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culation  would not be enough  to justify preventive  aggression,  and only a pre- 
emptive  response  to a threatened  injury  could  be sufficient  justification  for war. 
Confederacies  might  be the best means  of defending  against  such injuries,  but  if 
they failed, an evidently  aggressive  power  which threatened  the liberties  of Eu- 
rope should be opposed and weakened in the interests  of the great common- 
wealth and in accordance  with justice and  probity.52  Michael  Walzer  has taken 
Burke  to be the opponent  and  Vattel  the proponent  of intervention  to uphold  the 
balance  of power  that  maintained  the stability  of the European  "republic";  how- 
ever,  whatever  Burke's  views may have been in 1760, by 1793 he had come to 
agree  with Vattel  that  such intervention  in defense of the balance  of power was 
justifiable.53 
Vattel's  key historical  example  of such  justifiable  precaution  was the War  of 
the Spanish Succession. In that war, as Whigs had argued  at the time and as 
Vattel  agreed  half a century  later,  Louis XIV had presented  a dire threat  to the 
whole European  order  by his designs for universal  monarchy.54  Because Burke 
similarly  saw 1789 in the light of 1688, he  judged the War  against  the Directory 
to be conceptually  equivalent  to the War  of the Spanish  Succession.  The Treaty 
of Utrecht  that  had  ended  that  war  enshrined  the balance  of power as the central 
regulating  principle  of the international  order  in opposition  to the threat  of uni- 
versal monarchy  from a power such as Louis XIV's France.  Reason of state 
after 1713 therefore  made preventive aggression  justifiable in defense of the 
balance  against  aspiring  universal  monarchs.  The Whiggish idiom of universal 
monarchy  and the memory of the wars that  had spawned  it clearly lay behind 
Burke's warning  in the Letters on a Regicide Peace that "France,  on her new 
system, means to form a universal empire, by producing  a universal  revolu- 
tion."55  This was the logical successor to Burke's argument  in the Reflections 
that  the French  Revolution  and its aftermath  should  be seen in light of the Glo- 
rious Revolution.  The analogy  was useful precisely because  the common  max- 
ims of European  civilization  and  security  so menacingly  threatened  by the "new 
52 Vattel,  Droit des Gens, III. 3. 44, 47-49. 
53 Michael Walzer,  Just and Unjust Wars  (New York, 19922),  76-80, quoting Burke's  An- 
nual Register,  3 (1760), 2; and see Gaetano  L. Vincitorio,  "Edmund  Burke and the First Parti- 
tion of Poland: Britain and the Crisis of 1772 in the 'Great Republic,"' Crisis in the "Great 
Republic  ": Essays Presented to Ross J. Hoffman,  ed. Gaetano  L. Vincitorio  (New York, 1969), 
33-42. 
54 John  Robertson,  "Universal  Monarchy  and the Liberties  of Europe:  David Hume's Cri- 
tique of an English Whig Doctrine,"  Political Discourse in Early Modern  Britain, ed. Nicholas 
Phillipson and Quentin Skinner  (Cambridge,  1993), 356-68. 
55 Edmund  Burke, Third  Letter on a Regicide Peace, in McDowell (ed.), Writings  and 
Speeches, IX, 340. Thomas  L. Pangle and Peter  J. Ahrensdorf,  Justice Among  Nations: On the 
Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence,  Kan., 1999), 184, argue  that "it is in his loathing 
of universal  empire  that  Burke  stands  furthest,  in his conception  of international  relations,  from 
his otherwise favorite authority,  the Roman patriot Cicero," though this fails to distinguish 
between differing conceptions of "universal  empire"  (on which see, for example, Cicero, De 
Officiis, II. 27). 
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system"  of the French  and  upheld  by Vattel.56  Vattel's  argument  was partly  the 
product  of the opening  phase  of the Seven  Years'  War,  and  in it he assumed  -as 
Bolingbroke,  Hume, Robertson,  and Gibbon also did57-  that the balance of 
power as enshrined  in the Treaty  of Utrecht  was the basis of the international 
order.  Burke  returned  to the same origin  to argue  that,  "[i]fto prevent  Louis the 
XIVth from imposing his religion was just, a war to prevent  the murderers  of 
Louis XVIth from  imposing  their  irreligion  upon  us is just."58 
The Revolutionary  Wars  would in due course shatter  the European  balance 
of power and, as Paul Schroeder  has argued,  thereby irreversibly  transform 
European  politics.59  Burke  was the prophet  of the transformation,  and he fore- 
saw it with the help of Vattel,  in accordance  with post-Utrecht  reason  of state.  In 
the Remarks  on the Policy of the Allies (1793) he cited Vattel  to show that  the 
right  to intervene  became  a duty  in certain  circumstances,  according  to "whether 
it be a bona  fide charity  to a party,  and a prudent  precaution  with regard  to 
yourself."  As Burke  showed  with an appendix  of extracts  from  Vattel,  interven- 
tion against France  would be a "prudent  precaution"  for all European  states 
precisely  because  the French  republic  presented  an  unprecedented  threat  to their 
natural  reasons  of state  -their  interests,  their  security,  and  above  all their  shared 
political maxims as partners  in the commonwealth  of Europe.60  Proximity,  vi- 
cinity,  and  legitimate  apprehension  of danger  therefore  justified intervention:  as 
Burke  crisply  summarized  this position in 1796, "I  should  certainly  dread  more 
from a wild cat in my bed-chamber,  than from all the lions that roar in the 
deserts  beyond  Algiers."61 
56 See J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism  and Religion, I: The  Enlightenments  of Edward  Gibbon, 
1737-1764 (Cambridge,  1999), 109-13, 133-34, 138-39, and Barbarism  and Religion, II: Nar- 
ratives of Civil Government  (Cambridge,  1999), 170, 219, 275-77. 
57 Bolingbroke  s Defence of the Treaty  of Utrecht,  ed. G. M. Trevelyan  (Cambridge,  1932); 
David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power" (1752), in Eugene F. Miller  (ed.), Hume, Essays: 
Moral, Political and Literary  (Indianapolis,  1987), 338-41; Frederick  G. Whelan,  "Robertson, 
Hume, and the Balance of Power,"  Hume Studies, 21 (1995), 315-32; Jeremy  Black, "Gibbon 
and International  Relations," Edward Gibbon and Empire, ed. Rosamond McKitterick  and 
Roland Quinault  (Cambridge, 1997), 225-28. 
58 Edmund  Burke,  First Letter  on a Regicide Peace (1796), in Writings  and Speeches, ed. 
McDowell, IX, 238; compare  Burke,  A Letter  to a Member  of the National  Assembly  (1791), in 
Writings  and Speeches, ed. Mitchell,  VIII, 306: "The  princes  of Europe,  in the beginning  of this 
century,  did well not to suffer  the monarchy  of France  to swallow up the others.  They ought not 
now, in my opinion, to suffer  all the monarchies  and commonwealths  to be swallowed up in the 
gulph of this polluted anarchy." 
59 Paul W. Schroeder,  The  Transformation  of European  Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford, 1994). 
60 Edmund  Burke, Remarks  on the Policy of the Allies (1793), in Writings  and Speeches, 
ed. Mitchell, VIII, 474; the "Appendix"  of extracts from Vattel is inexplicably omitted from 
this edition. For a fragment  of Burke's working notes on Vattel see Sheffield City Libraries 
Wentworth  Woodhouse Muniments, 10/27, (passage transcribed  from Vattel,  Droit des Gens, 
II. 12. 196-97, printed  in Burke,  Remarks  on the Policy of the Allies [London, 1793], 207-9). 
61 Burke, First Letter on a Regicide Peace in Writings  and Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 
259 (arguing  against  Charles  James  Fox's claim that  the French  republic  should be tolerated  on 
the same grounds  that  justified keeping a consul in Algiers). 
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Burke  argued  in the Thoughts  on French  Affairs (1791) that,  though  there 
had  been  many  internal  revolutions  within  the governments  of Europe,  none (not 
even the Glorious  Revolution)  had effects beyond their  own limited  territories. 
However,  he added: 
The present  Revolution  in France  seems to me to be quite of another 
character  and description;  and to bear little resemblance  or analogy  to 
any of those which have been brought  about  in Europe,  upon  principles 
merely  political.  It is a Revolution  of doctrine  and theoretick  dogma. It 
has a much  greater  resemblance  to those  changes  which  have  been made 
upon  religious  grounds,  in which a spirit  of proselytism  makes  an  essen- 
tial part. 
The last Revolution of doctrine  and theory which has happened  in 
Europe,  is the Reformation  ... [the] effect [of which] was to introduce 
other interests into all countries, than those which arose from their 
locality and natural circumstances.62 
To introduce  alien interests,  as the Reformation  had  done and  as the Revolution 
threatened  to do, and in particular  to introduce  alien interests  which claimed 
universal  applicability,  such as justification  by faith or the rights of man, dis- 
solved the necessary  connection  between a state's  natural  situation  and  the idi- 
omatic  interests  it generated.  Thereby,  "if they did not absolutely  destroy,  [they] 
at least weakened and distracted  the locality of patriotism"63  and with it the 
determinative,  organic  reasons  of state. 
Throughout  the 1790s and  particularly  during  the opening  years of the war 
against  the Directory  Burke  maintained  that  Britain  and  its allies were engaged 
against  France  in a "religious  war,"  "a  moral  war"  against  the "armed  doctrine" 
of "a sect aiming at universal  empire."64  Of course  he was not alone in arguing 
that  the war against  the Directory  was a war of religion;  such arguments  were a 
staple of Anglican polemic during  the early years of the war. This "new and 
unheard-of  scheme of conquest  and aggrandizement  ... the total subversion  of 
every lawful government,  of all order,  of all property,  and of all established 
religion"  could only be resisted  by a "just  and necessary war,"  argued  Walker 
King at Gray's Inn in 1793. "The nation with whom we are at war,"  Charles 
62 Burke, Thoughts  on French  Affairs, in Further  Reflections  on the Revolution  in France, 
ed. Ritchie, 208 (Burke's emphases). 
63 Burke, Thoughts  on French  Affairs, in Further  Reflections  on the Revolution  in France, 
ed. Ritchie, 209. 
64  Burke,  Remarks  on the  Policy of the  Allies (1793), in Writings  and Speeches,  ed. Mitchell, 
VIII,  485; Fourth  Letter  on a Regicide  Peace (1795-96), in Writings  and Speeches,  ed. McDowell, 
IX, 70; First Letter on a Regicide Peace (1796), in Writings  and Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 
199; Second Letter on a Regicide Peace, in Writings  and Speeches, ed. McDowell, IX, 267. 
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Manners  Sutton  told the members  of the House of Lords  in the following year, 
"is professedly a heathen nation; and unless it shall please God to spare his 
people, our laws, and liberty,  and religion, are inevitably lost." Such "a war 
against  all Religion, carried  on in the very center  of Christendom,  by a people 
hitherto  numbered  among  the most enlightened  of nations,"  George  Gordon  in- 
formed his audience in Exeter on the same day, "is a novelty in history";  to 
oppose  it would  demand  "a  war  of ster necessity,  and  consequently  of the strictest 
justice."65  However,  Burke's  charge  of universal  empire  hinted  that  the French 
republic  was as great a threat  to the common maxims of the great  republic  of 
Europe as Louis XIV had been almost a century earlier.  In his international 
theory  as in his political theory  Burke  remained  true  to the ideological inherit- 
ance of English  Whiggism  not least  because  he drew  so heavily  on Vattel,  whose 
anglophilia  was decidedly  Whig in complexion66  and  whose doctrines  of the law 
of nations  were directed  to the same end as Burke's,  that  is, to the defense of the 
European  balance  of power and  the new international  reasons  of state  originally 
guaranteed  by the Treaty  of Utrecht. 
Burke  was more  than  just a conspiracy  theorist  of the Revolution  (though  he 
did sympathize  with those, like the Abbe Barruel,  who saw free-thinkers,  Free- 
masons,  and  Jews behind  the events of 1789 and  thereafter);67  he was also more 
than  simply  the  most frantic  and  prominent  apologist  for  Anglicanism  in the face 
of French  revolutionary  atheism  (though  there  is truth  in that  view, too). He was 
in fact a classic early modem theorist  of reason  of state within the natural-law 
tradition  revived by Grotius  and revised by Vattel. Reason of state made the 
internal  and external  realms of state policy mutually  intelligible for Burke;  it 
provided  him with an argument  to ensure  security  in extremity  without  destroy- 
ing security,  property,  or law;  and  it provided  the most  persuasive  analysis  of the 
collapse of the European  state system, the failure  of the balance  of power, and 
the desperate  need for self-preservation  compelled  by the French  Revolution.68 
This strain  within Burke's  political thought  showed that  reason  of state  had  not 
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lost its rational basis long before 1789 (pace Reinhard Koselleck);69 it also dem- 
onstrated that it was not a necessary consequence  of reason-of-state theory that 
it should  separate a state's domestic  maxims  from its foreign  policies  (pace 
Meinecke);70 and it proved, to Burke's satisfaction  (as it no doubt would have 
been to Vattel's, too),  that reason of state was not by definition  the enemy  of 
"law or innate moral principles" (pace almost everybody).71 
However,  Vattel and Burke stood at the end of this tradition of reason of 
state. After all, it was in the context  of the same late eighteenth-century  wars 
that Kant and Bentham  produced their respective  plans for perpetual peace, 
each of whom attempted to conceive cooperative, transparent  international  norms 
and institutions that would render such reason of state inoperable and obsolete.72 
Both also questioned the Whiggishly  self-congratulatory  account of the Glori- 
ous Revolution on whose historical foundations Burke's theory rested, Kant be- 
cause it exemplified  both a "monstrous" appeal to "a right of necessity"  (ius in 
casu  necessitatis)  and a tacit, standing right to rebellion  without  restriction, 
Bentham because he could not see it as beneficial  for the interest of the nation 
(rather than to the "particular interest of the aristocratical leaders in the revolu- 
tion").73  The Kantian categorical imperative and Bentham's greatest happiness 
principle provided competing  but equally fatal alternatives to this tradition of 
reason of state; their anathematization of it opened up that gulf between morality 
and politics out of which Meinecke's instrumentalist  account-and,  consequently, 
almost everyone else's-emerged.  To place Burke on one side or the other of this 
argument has always risked distorting historical accounts of his thought, whether 
in the political  sphere or the international realm; it has also sharpened the dis- 
tinction between these two arenas in ways which neither early moder  theorists 
of reason of state nor Burke himself would have recognized. Burke's place in the 
history of international thought should therefore be assimilated more closely  to 
his  position  in the traditions of  political  thought,  as a standing reproach to 
procrustean taxonomies  and overhasty appropriations. 
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